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Economic Perspective 3 
THE COST OF PIT CLOSURES: SOW UMRESOLVED ISSUES 
David Williams, Department of Economics 
University of Strathclyde 
Television and newspaper coverage of the 
coal dispute was extensive, but i t i s 
unlikely that the general public learned 
very much from the principal spokesmen 
(for either side) about the real problems 
involved in assessing the costs of p i t 
closure. 
with the redundancy payments offered by 
the Board, would e n t a i l a net loss of two 
hundred and seventy million pounds in the 
f i r s t year, a loss in the next four years 
of approximately one hundred and ten 
mill ion pounds per year, and an annual 
l o s s of seventy m i l l i o n pounds in 
subsequent years. 
Several in teres t ing and highly competent 
s t u d i e s were completed during the 
dispute*, some of which were commissioned 
as background papers for t e l e v i s i o n 
programmes, but they appear to have had 
l i t t l e effect on the nature of the public 
debate. 
The studies presented widely differing 
estimates of the gains and costs likely to 
be occasioned by a closure programme. 
The study most favourable to the Coal 
Board's case estimated that there would be 
a net gain from closures by the second 
year, and tha t the gain would increase 
steadily in each succeeding year (with a 
s ix year time hor izon) . Closures 
envisaged would entail the loss of 20,000 jobs, and by the f i f th year af ter the 
closures net gains would be more than 
£500m per y e a r . The s tudy most 
unfavourable to the Coal Board's case 
estimated that there would be net losses 
in every year of i t s seven year time 
h o r i z o n . On t h e b a s i s of i t s 
calculat ions, the loss of 20,000 jobs, 
The principal value of these s tudies , 
however, l ies less in the conclusions that 
were reached, than in the arguments which 
led to these conc lus ions and in the 
differing assumptions made about both the 
range and the magnitude of savings and 
costs involved in a closure programme. 
I t i s evident from an examination of these 
s t u d i e s t h a t t he r e are s i g n i f i c a n t 
unresolved questions concerning estimation 
of the real loss sustained by keeping the 
p i t s open and tha t there are equally 
contentious issues involved in estimating 
the t o t a l l i k e l y cos t of a c losure 
programme. 
Reservations have been expressed by people 
of very different p o l i t i c a l persuasion 
about the adequacy of the National Coal 
Board's figures as a basis for decision-
making. Doubts have been expressed on at 
least three major issues. 
The f i r s t i s tha t prices paid to the NCB 
for a substant ia l par t of i t s output, and 
t h e p r i c e s paid by i t for a not 
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ins igni f icant part of i t s inputs , are 
distincly arbitrary. There are disputes 
among experts about whether the price paid 
by the CEGB, the Coal Board's principal 
customer, i s too high or too low. Andrew 
Glyn, of Corpus Chris t i College, Oxford, 
has argued that a more appropriate pricing 
policy for coal, in relation, for example, 
to the price that the CEGB pays for o i l , 
would have provided additional revenue of 
more than £1,500 m i l l i o n in 1983/84. 
There are , on the other hand, several 
au thor i t i e s who think tha t the CEGB i s 
obliged to pay too high a price for the 
coal i t buys. Some of these authorities 
base the i r argument on the (sometimes) 
lower p r i c e which could be paid for 
imported coal. I t i s undoubtedly t rue 
that there are times when the import price 
of coal i s lower than the domestic price, 
but i t v a r i e s a g r e a t deal wi th the 
changing value of sterling, and i t is also 
subject to cons iderab le v a r i a t i o n as 
market conditions change. 
There a re a l so sharp d i f f e r e n c e s of 
opinion about whether or not the terms on 
which capi ta l i s made avai lable to the 
Coal Board have imposed an unduly high 
burden of i n t e r e s t charges on the 
industry, and there is some question about 
the appropriateness of the price paid to 
British Rail for transporting coal. 
These are matters of serious contention 
among people knowledgeable of the 
industry. I t i s essent ia l to recognise 
that these are contentious i ssues , and 
that i t i s unwise to t r e a t est imates of 
performance based on ar t i f ic ia l prices as 
though they provide a c lear and accurate 
assessment of the economic cost of keeping 
pits open. 
The second d i f f icu l ty i s that recorded 
losses include substantial payments in 
respect of past a c t i v i t i e s of the mining 
i ndus t ry . There a r e , for example, 
s i g n i f i c a n t c o s t s wi th r e spec t to 
compensation for subsidence and with 
respect to redundancy and pension payments 
to former employees. These are costs 
which would have to be borne even if every 
pi t in the country were to be closed down, 
and they are not a relevant consideration 
in reviewing policy options. 
Thirdly, the costs assigned to particular 
p i t s as opera t ing c o s t s inc lude an 
assessment of the i r "share" of nat ional 
and d is t r ic t overheads. In the event of 
closure of a particular pi t these charges, 
which would be u n l i k e l y t o be 
s i g n i f i c a n t l y reduced, would be r e -
assigned among the remaining pi ts . 
There are, in short , grounds for serious 
reservation about the magnitude of savings 
that could real is t ical ly be expected from 
a closure programme. I t may be the case 
that adequate treatment of these issues 
would strengthen the case for closure, but 
members of the public, as well as members 
of the NUM, deserve a clearer statement on 
these vital matters than they have so far 
received. 
The d i rec t costs of a closure programme 
(in contrast to the costs of maintaining 
p i t in operation) include the costs of 
unemployment and supplementary benefit, as 
well as the cost of redundancy payments, 
together with transference and travelling 
costs for workers who move to another pit . 
There have been very large differences in 
the estimates offered (in various studies) 
of these cos ts . There are two major 
points of contention. The f i r s t i s the 
length of time for which the men who lose 
their jobs will be unemployed themselves 
or, if they do obtain jobs, wi l l simply 
displace other applicants for jobs who 
w i l l , in turn, be unemployed for longer 
periods. Glyn, followed by Kerevan and 
S a v i l l e , argues t h a t in p resen t and 
foreseable circumstances the general level 
of unemployment wi l l mean a v i r tua l ly 
permanent i n c r e a s e in the l e v e l of 
unemployment. On the other hand, some of 
the studies have assumed that most of the 
workers wi l l be able to find a l te rna t ive 
employment within two or three years. 
Craftsmen, such as e l e c t r i c i a n s and jo ine rs , may be in considerable demand, 
although they may well have to leave the 
communities in which they prefer to l ive, 
and may need a period of t ra ining to 
enable them to deal with the dif ferent 
r e q u i r e m e n t s of work in a n o t h e r 
environment. I t i s , however, unlikely 
that the prospects for most workers are 
anything but bleak. In any event, a 
great deal more information i s needed 
before one can make any r e a l i s t i c 
assessment of the cost to the public, to 
say nothing of the effect on the workers 
involved, of a large number of miners 
losing their jobs. 
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The other main point of contention is the 
l ikely secondary effect on employment. 
Reduced a c t i v i t y in t he m i n e s , 
particularly in regions which already have 
high unemployment, and l i t t l e chance of 
obtaining a s ignif icant share of new 
investment in the mining industry, w i l l 
lead to reduction in employment in firms 
which are supplying machinery and 
equipment for the mines. Moreover, the 
loss of income in the community will have 
mult ipl ier e f fec ts , due to the reduced 
demand for goods and services. Some 
estimates indicate that the secondary loss 
of employment wi l l be almost as high as 
the d i rec t loss . Experience wi l l no 
doubt differ g rea t ly among d i f f e r e n t 
communities, but in some cases the cost to 
the public will be very high. 
For some people (on both sides in the 
dispute) the s t r i k e might have been a 
predominantly p o l i t i c a l issue, but there 
were important economic issues involved. 
The economic questions, which have not 
been resolved, are not of mere academic 
in t e re s t , but involve serious dispute 
about costs to the general public of 
several hundred mill ion pounds. Public 
discussion about what i s to happen next in 
the coal mining industry is more likely to 
be constructive if some effort i s made to 
examine the l ike ly rea l consequences of 
policy decisions. The resources required 
substant ial ly to increase our knowledge 
and to provide a b a s i s for reasoned 
analysis would be very small compared to 
the damage t h a t might be caused by 
decisions made in ignorance of the likely 
consequences. 
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